篇一：一篇经济类英文论文(含中文翻译)
The Problem of Social Cost
社会成本问题
RONALD COASE
罗纳德·科斯
Ronald Coase is Professor Emeritus at University of Chicago LawSchool and a Nobel Laureate in Economics. This article is fromThe Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960). Several passages devoted to extended discussions of legal decisions
have been omitted.
罗纳德·科斯在芝加哥大学法学院名誉教授和诺贝尔经济学奖得主。本文是其外法学与经济学杂志（1960年10月）。专门的法律问题的决定的延伸讨论的几个
段落已被省略。
I. THE PROBLEM TO BE EXAMINED
This paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harm-ful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties. The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the factory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economies of Welfare. The conclusion to which this kind of analysis seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory li-able for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others). It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable.
一、要检查的问题
本文关注的是这些行动的企业有伤害他人有用的影响。标准的例子是，一个工厂的烟雾从那些占领邻近物业的有害影响。在这种情况下的经济分析，通常已在工厂的私人和社会产品之间的分歧方面着手，在经济学家们基本上遵循治疗庇古福利经济。这种分析的结论，似乎使大多数经济学家是工厂里的烟雾，或者受伤的人造成的损害能够使雇主，这将是可取的，上放置一个税在金钱方面的损害，或最后，它会导致排除住宅区（大概是从其他地区排放的烟雾将有对他人有害影响）工厂厂主不同的金额产生的烟雾，相当于。行动的建议的课程是不合适的，因为它们导致的结果是不一定，甚至是通常情况下，可取的，它是我的论点。
II. THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be
made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to, B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm. I instanced in my previous article the case of a confectioner the noise and vibrations from whose machinery disturbed a doctor in his work. To avoid harming the doctor would inflict harm on the confectioner. The problem posed by this case was essentially whether it was worth while, as a result of restricting the methods of production which could be used by the confectioner, to secure more doctoring at the cost of a reduced supply of confectionery products. Another example is afforded by the problem of straying cattle which destroy crops on neighbouring land. If it is inevitable that some cattle will stray, all increase in the supply of meat can only be obtained at the expense of a decrease in the supply of crops. The nature of the choice is clear: meat or crops. What answer should be given is, of course, not clear unless we know the value of what is obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it. To give another example, Professor George J. Stigler instances the contamination of a stream. If we assume that the harmful effect of the pollution is that it kills the fish, the question to be decided is: is the value of the fish lost greater or less than the value of the product which the contamination of the stream makes possible. It goes almost without saying that this problem has to be looked at in total and at the margin.
二、互惠性的问题
传统的做法往往掩盖作出的选择，自然。这个问题通常被认为作为一个在B上一个敌人造成的伤害和什么要决定的是：我们应该如何抑制一个？但这是错误的。我们正在处理的互惠性质的问题。为了避免伤害，B将A上造成的危害，真正的问题，必须决定是：应该允许A损害B或应允许B伤害吗？问题是要避免更严重的伤害。我在我以前的文章中实例化一个糕点师的噪音和振动机械不安医生在他的工作情况。为了避免伤及医生会造成伤害的糕点。基本上这种情况下所造成的问题是它是否值得，作为一种限制方法可以用于糕点生产的结果，以争取更多的糖果产品的供应减少，成本篡改。另一个例子是给予由偏离破坏邻近土地上的农作物的牛的问题。如果这是不可避免的，一些牛会偏离，只能获得所有的肉类供应增加作物供应减少开支。选择的性质是明确的：肉类或农作物。应给予什么样的答案是，当然，不明确的，除非我们知道得到什么价值，以及什么牺牲得到它的价值。给另一个例如，教授乔治·J.斯蒂格勒实例流的污染。如果我们假定污染的有害影响是，它杀死的鱼，将要决定的问题是：是鱼的价值损失大于或小于流的污染，使产品的价值。当然，几乎没有说，这个问题要看着总保证金。
III. THE PRICING SYSTEM WITH LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
I propose to start my analysis by examining a case in which most economists would presumably agree that the problem would be solved in a compeletely satisfactory manner: when the damaging business has to pay for all damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly (strictly this means that the operation of a pricing system is
without cost).
A good example of the problem under discussion is afforded by the case of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on neighbouring land. Let us sup-pose that a farmer and cattle-raiser are operating on neighbouring properties. Let us further suppose that, without any fencing between the properties, an increase in the size of the cattle-raiser’s herd increases the total damage to the farmer’s crops. What happens to the marginal damage as the size of the herd increases is another matter. This depends on whether the cattle tend to follow one another or to roam side by side, on whether they tend to be more or less restless as the size of the herd increases and on other similar factors. For my immediate purpose, it is immaterial what assumption is made about marginal damage as the size of the herd increases.
Given that the cattle-raiser is liable for the damage caused, the additional annual cost imposed on the cattle-raiser if he increased his herd from, say, 2 to 3 steers is $3 and in deciding on the size of the herd, he will take this into account along with his other costs. That is, he will not increase the size of the herd unless the value of the additional meat produced (assuming that the cattle-raiser slaughters the cattle) is greater than the additional costs that this will entail, including the value of the additional crops destroyed. Of course, if, by the employment of dogs, herdsmen, aeroplanes, mobile radio and other means, the amount of damage can be reduced, these means will be adopted when their cost is less than the value of the crop which they prevent being lost. Given that the annual cost of fencing is $9, the cattle-raiser who wished to have a herd with 4 steers or more would pay for fencing to be erected and maintained, assuming that other means of attaining the same end would not do so more cheaply. When the fence is erected, the marginal cost due to the liability for damage becomes zero, except to the extent that an increase in the size of the herd necessitates a stronger and therefore more expensive fence because more steers are liable to lean against it at the same time. But, of course, it may be cheaper for the cattle-raiser not to fence and to pay for the damaged crops, as in my arithmetical example, with 3 or fewer steers.
It might be thought that the fact that the cattle-raiser would pay for all crops damaged would lead the farmer to increase his planting if a cattle-raiser came to occupy the neighbouring property. But this is not so. If the crop was previously sold in conditions of perfect competition, marginal cost was equal to price for the amount of planting undertaken and any expansion would have reduced the profits of the farmer. In the new situation, the existence of crop damage would mean that the farmer would sell less on the open market but his receipts for a given production would remain the same, since the cattle-raiser would pay the market price for any crop damaged. Of course, if cattle-raising commonly involved the destruction of crops, the coming into existence of a cattle-raising industry might raise the price of the crops involved and farmers would then extend their planting. But I wish to confine my attention to the individual farmer.
I have said that the occupation of a neighbouring property by a cattle-raiser would not cause the amount of production, or perhaps more exactly the amount of planting, by the farmer to increase. In fact, if the cattle-raising has any effect, it will be to decrease the amount of planting. The reason for this is that, for any given tract of land, if the value of the crop damaged is so great that the receipts from the sale of the undamaged crop are less than the total costs of cultivating that tract of land, it will be profitable for the farmer and the cattle-raiser to make a bargain whereby that tract of land is left uncultivated. This can be made clear by means of an arithmetical example. Assume initially that the value of the crop obtained from cultivating a given tract of land is $12 and that the cost incurred in cultivating this tract of land is $10, the net gain from cultivating the land being $2. I assume for purposes of simplicity that the farmer owns the land. Now assume that the cattle-raiser starts operations on the neighbouring property and that the value of the crops damaged is $1.In this case $11 is obtained by the farmer from sale on the market and $1 is obtained from the cattle-raiser for damage suffered and the net gain remains $2. Now suppose that the cattle-raiser finds it profitable to increase the size of his herd, even though the amount of damage rises to $3; which means that the value of the additional meat production is greater than the additional costs, including the additional $2 payment for damage. But the total payment for damage is now $3. The net gain to the farmer from cultivating the land is still $2. The cattle-raiser would be better off if the farmer would agree not to cultivate his land for any payment less than $3. The farmer would be agreeable to not cultivating the land for any payment greater than $2. There is clearly room for a mutually satisfactory bargain which would lead to the abandonment of cultivation. * But the same argument applies not only to the whole tract cultivated by the fanner but also to any subdivision of it. Suppose, for example, that the cattle have a well-defined route, say, to a brook or to a shady area. In these circumstances, the amount of damage to the crop along the route may well be great and if so, it could be that the farmer and the cattle-raiser would find it profitable to make a bargain whereby the farmer would agree not to cultivate this strip of land.
But this raises a further possibility. Suppose that there is such a well de-fined route. Suppose further that the value of the crop that would be obtained by cultivating this strip of land is $10 but that the cost of cultivation is $11. In the absence of the cattle-raiser, the land would not be cultivated. However, given the presence of the cattle-raiser, it could well be that if the strip was cultivated, the whole crop would be destroyed by the cattle. In which case, the cattle-raiser would be forced to pay $10 to the farmer. It is true that the farmer would lose $1. But the cattle-raiser would lose $10. Clearly this is a situation which is not likely to last indefinitely since neither party would want this to happen. The aim of the farmer would be to induce the cattle-raiser to make a payment in return for an agreement to leave this land uncultivated. The farmer would not be able to obtain a payment greater than the cost of fencing off this piece of land nor so high as to lead the cattle-raiser to abandon the use of the neighbouring property. What payment would in fact be made would depend
on the shrewdness of the farmer and the cattle-raiser as bargain-ers. But as the payment would not be so high as to cause the cattle-raiser to abandon this location and as it would not vary with the size of the herd, such an agreement would not affect the allocation of resources but would merely alter the distribution of income and wealth as between the cattle-raiser and the farmer.
I think it is clear that if the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly, the reduction in the value of production elsewhere will be taken into account in computing the additional cost involved in increasing the size of the herd. This cost will be weighed against the value of the additional meat production and, given perfect competition in the cattle industry, the allocation of resources in cattle-raising will be optimal. What needs to be emphasized is that the fall in the value of production elsewhere which would be taken into account in the costs of the cattle-raiser may well be less than the damage which the cattle would cause to the crops in the ordinary course of events. This is because it is possible, as a result of market transactions, to discontinue cultivation of the land. This is desirable in all cases in which the damage that the cattle would cause, and for which the cattle-raiser would be willing to pay, exceeds the amount which the farmer would pay for use of the land. In conditions of perfect competition, the amount which the farmer would pay for the use of the land is equal to the difference between the value of the total production when the factors are employed on this land and the value of the additional product yielded in their next best use (which would be what the farmer would have to pay for the factors). If damage exceeds the amount the farmer would pay for the use of the land, the value of the additional product of the factors employed elsewhere would exceed the value of the total product in this use after damage is taken into account. It follows that it would be desirable to abandon cultivation of the land and to release the factors employed for production elsewhere. A procedure which merely provided for payment for damage to the crop caused by the cattle but which did not allow for the possibility of cultivation being discontinued would result in too small an employment of factors of production in cattle-raising and too large an employment of factors in cultivation of the crop. But given the possibility of market transactions, a situation in which damage to crops exceeded the rent of the land would not endure. Whether the cattle-raiser pays the farmer to leave the land uncultivated or himself rents the land by paying the land-owner an amount slightly greater than the farmer would pay (if the farmer was himself renting the land), the final result would be the same and would maximise the value of production. Even when the farmer is induced to plant crops which it would not be profitable to cultivate for sale on the market, this will be a purely short-term phenomenon and may be ex(原文来自：wWw.xiaOcAofANweN.coM 小 草 范 文 网:经济学英语论文)pected to lead to an agreement under which the planting will cease. The cattle-raiser will remain in that location and the marginal cost of meat production will be the same as before, thus having no long-run effect on the allocation of resources.
三、损害赔偿责任的定价制度
篇二：英语论文-中国在世界经济中的优势与劣势
对外经济贸易大学远程教育毕业论文
(仅供同学们参考)
毕业论文/设计
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中国在世界经济中的优势与劣势
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Index
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………….6
Chapter 1 Introduction and Overview………………………………………………...7 Chapter 2 China’s Strengths in the World Economy…………………………………8
2.1 Economy-oriented Policy……………………………………………………8
2.2 Huge Market………………………………………………………………...10
2.3 Low Cost and High Quality of Human Resource…………………………...11
Chapter 3 China’s Weaknesses in the World Economy……………………………....13
3.1 Absence of Credit Legal and Judicial System………………………………13
3.2 Inefficiency in State Owned Enterprises and Financial System…………….13
3.3 Inadequate Infrastructure…………………………………………………...15
3.4 Unemployment and Income Disparity……………………………………..16
3.5 Pollution……………………………………………………………………17 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………18
Reference……………………………………………………………………………..19
篇三：经济学专业英语论文
Back In The Cold
In the 1930s, north-eastern China industrialized under
Japanese military control, after the establish of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong made it the heartland of heavy manufacturing. At that time, it’s a glory of China. But its star faded as China opened to the world in the 1980s. The deltas of the Changjiang and Pearl rivers made more fertile ground for entrepreneurs; So north-east lost it’s advantages in competition, over-capacity in heavy industry is also pervasive. All of these lead the north-east to a sharp and painful downturn.
The government was trying to change the situation. In the late 1990s, Zhu Rongji, China’s then prime minister, took a knife to loss-making state-owned companies to reduce the burden of the central government. As a result, unemployment soared and mass protests spread, but the problems in north-east were still there, it proved this measure haven’t worked well.
The government came up with a plan named “revitalize the old north-east industrial bases” in 2003. The idea was to transform state factories into lean, modern entities; To broaden the economy by cultivating new industries, from tourism to software. Judging by growth only, the government achieved almost instant results. The north-east’s average growth of 12.4% in 2008-12 was nearly three
percentage points above the national pace, making it China’s
fastest-growing region. What’s more, the region’s GDP that made by the state-owned firms has fallen to about 50%, still above the national average of 30%, but progress nonetheless. But what we can’t ignore is that the structure of the north-east’s economy has worsened in a more important respect. It has become ever more reliant on investment and manufacturing, both geared to the now slowing property market, but in the other parts of China, services now accounting for more of GDP than manufacturing, that means the north-east has gone in the other direction.
Problems came again. Over-capacity in the realty industry led many companies and even the local government into a capital tense situation. Their dominant commercial relations have been with Japan, but heightened tensions between China and Japan in the past few years have got in the way. Japanese investment in Liaoning was 33.5% lower year-on-year in the first three quarters of 2014. In the other hand, the birth rate in the north-east is less than one child per women: a third lower than the national average. What makes worse is emigration, with a net 2 million residents working in other parts of china. All these made the north-east suffering a lot, now it has some “ghost towns”, which are designed for people who used to work in the big cities.
The central government is worried again. Li Keqiang, the prime minister said the nation owed a debt to the north-east for its contributions to China’s development. Soon after, the cabinet unveiled a list of 35 measures--a new “revitalization” strategy to help the region. Encouragingly, they dovetail with a new round of market reforms that the government is promoting across China.
Some questions come into my mind. These measures probably will make the economy of north-east turn to a good way, but for how long? What will the government do when it decline again? Can we solve the problem in north-east in one time? Actually, what happened in the past decades shows that whatever measures the central government have taken to revitalize the old north-east
industry bases, it only solve the ostensible problem, when the central government takes measures, that means billions of cash flow, we also know that bureaucracy was excessive and that the falsification of data was rampant in China, so it’s extremely difficult for me to believe that the capital will be used to revitalize the economy only. So, I believe what the central government do will only make the economy situation get better for a few years, this kind of behavior is a waste of money and time.
From the foreign experience and the reality, we know that market have the ability to regulate itself. When a region’s economy
goes down, capital will flow to direction that suits the condition better, maybe it will take time, maybe the process is painful, but by this way, the market will gain the energy and precious experience to regulate itself, the central government won’t have to be worried every time when the economy goes down.
But the situation here in China is a little complicated. The central government has a strong control over the whole country in every aspect, it’s like the head of a family. State companies and even the private firms run their business under the control of the central government or at least follow its directions, “letting go” means it will lose much wealth and the power to control. As the past few years have shown, letting go is hard to do in China’s old industrial heartland.
So the best way to get the north-east out of cold is letting go, we hope the government will have the courage to do it as soon as possible.