篇一：对外经济贸易大学国际商法案例参考资料案例篇
案例讨论1
Lucy et al. v. Zehmer et al.
84 S.E. (2d) 516, 196 Va. 493 (1954)
Complainants instituted this suit to have specific performance of a contract by which it was alleged the defendants had sold to W.O. Lucy for $50,000 a tract of land known as the Ferguson farm, owned by defendant A. H. Zehmer. J. C. Lucy, the other complainant, is a brother of W. O. Lucy, to whom W. O. Lucy transferred a half interest in his alleged purchase.
The instrument sought to be enforced was written by A. H. Zehmer on December 20, 1952, in these words: “We hereby agree to sell to W. O. Lucy the Ferguson farm for $50,000, title satisfactory to buyer,” signed by both defendants.
The answer of A. H. Zehmer admitted that at the time mentioned W.O. Lucy offered him $50,000 cash for the farm but that he (Zehmer) considered that the offer was made in jest; that so thinking, and both he and Lucy having had several drinks, he wrote out the “memorandum” quoted above and induced his wife to sign it; that he did not deliver the memorandum to Lucy, but Lucy picked it up, read it, put it in his pocket, and attempted to offer him $5.00 to bind the bargain; that he refused to accept, and, realizing for the first time that Lucy was serious, assured him that he had no intention of selling the farm, and that he whole matter was a joke. Lucy left the premises insisting that he had purchased the farm.On Monday, December 22nd, Lucy engaged an attorney to examine the title. The attorney reported favorably on December 31st, and on January 2nd Lucy wrote to Zehmer stating that the title was satisfactory and that he was ready to pay the purchase price in cash, and asking when Zehmer would be ready to close the deal. Zehmer replied by letter asserting that he had never agreed or intended to sell the farm. Thereupon complainants brought this suit. The issue is whether the agreement was entered into with contractual intent or was merely a joke.
Buchanan, J. In his testimony Zehmer claimed that he “was high as a Georgia pine,” and that the transaction “was just a bunch of two doggoned drunks bluffing to see who could talk the biggest and say the most.” That claim is inconsistent with his attempt to testify in great detail as to what was said and what was done…The record is convincing that Zehmer was not intoxicated to the extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequence of the instrument he executed, and hence that instrument is not to be invalidated on that ground.
The evidence is convincing also that Zehmer wrote two agreements, the first one beginning “I hereby agree to sell”; that Lucy told him that he wanted Zehmer?s wife to sign the memorandum; and that Zehmer tore up the first agreement and then made a second one which read “We hereby agree to sell.” Both he and his wife signed the second memorandum.
The appearance of the contract; the fact that it was under discussion for forty minutes or more before it was signed; Lucy?s objection to the first draft because it was written in the singular and he wanted Mrs. Zehmer to sign it also; the rewriting to meet that objection and the signing by Mrs. Zehmer; the discussion of what was to be included in the sale; the provision for examination of the title; the completeness of the instrument that was exe
cuted; the taking possession of it by Lucy with no request or suggestion by either of the defendants that he give it back, are facts which furnish persuasive evidence that the execution of the contract was a serious business transaction rather than a casual, jesting matter, as defendants now contend.
In the field of contracts, as generally elsewhere, “We must look to the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention rather than his secret or unexpressed intention. The law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.” First Nat. Exchange Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil Co., 169 Va. 99, 192 S.E. 764.
The mental assent of the parties is not requisite for a formation of a contract. If the words or other acts of one of the parties have but one reasonable meaning, his undisclosed intention is immaterial expect where an ueasonable meaning which he attaches to his manifestations is known to the other party.
An agreement or mutual assent is of course essential to a valid contract but the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts. So a person cannot set up that he was merely jesting when his conduct and words would warrant a reasonable person in believing that he intended a real agreement. Reversed.
思考题：
1．你是否认为， 不管被告喝了多少酒， 醉到什么程度， 判决结果都会对他不利？
2．被告先后签了两份协议对判决结果产生了什么影响？
3．法官在其判决意见的第三自然段列举了一系列的事实， 其目的何在？
4．如何理
解 “The law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.”?
5．你认为本案被告 “表达出来的意思” 与 “保留与内心的意思” 是相同的， 还是不同的
本案的issue
为： “Whether or not the final agreement was entered into with contractual intent or was merely a joke.” 就是说Zehmer后来所立的协议是否是一有拘束力的合同， 并且其后来无意出售农场是否受到此协议的约束。
我的分析：
“The evidence is convincing also that Zehmer wrote two agreements, the first one beginning “I hereby agree to sell”; that Lucy told him that he wanted Zehmer?s wife to sign the memorandum; and that Zehmer tore up the first agreement and then made a second one which read “We hereby agree to sell.” Both he and his wife signed the second memorandum.” 可以说明， 协议的重新拟订的过程确实是严肃认真的， 并且做到了双方的合
意。 “ that so thinking, and both he and Lucy having had several drinks, he wrote out the “memorandum” quoted above and induced his wife to sign it; that he did not deliver the memorandum to Lucy, but Lucy picked it up, read it, put it in his pocket, and attempted to offer him $5.00 to bind the bargain;” 而且可以表明， Zehmer 虽然喝了酒， 但绝对没有到不能理解协议内容的程度。 综上， 被告Zehmer虽没有出卖的意思， 但其外在行为已足使原告或者其他人相信其本人有订约的意思。
所以，
“We must look to the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention rather than his secret or unexpressed intention. The law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.” 我们必须看当事人意图的外在表示， 而不是其内在的未表示出来的秘不可测的意图。
1 ． 思考题1 ， 回答是否定的， 也就是说不管被告喝了多少酒， 醉到什么程度， 判决结果不一定都对他不利， 结合本案， 如果被告喝酒喝得烂醉， 以致于失去了理解协议内容的能力的话， 我想判决就倾向于对他有利了。
2 。 被告先后签了两份协议， 如前所述， 有理由使法官相信此一订立协议的过程是严肃认真的， 且已做到了双方的合意， 为一有效的有约束力的合同。
3 。 其目的是为了说明订立合同有双方合意的证据， 并不是开玩笑。
4 。 结合本案， 应理解为， 法律所赋予人们的同意的意思表示应该以其意图的外在表示为准， 而不应考察其未表示出来的真实的内心意思。
5 。 我认为本案 “表达出来的意思” 与 “保留于内心的意思” 是不同的， 也就是说， 其实Zehmer 内心是不愿意为此一订立合同的行为的， 但是， 如前所述， 第三人有理由通过Zehmer的言行相信他有订合同的意图， 况且， 基于诚实信用原则， 如果允许人人在订好合同后在反悔， 那么有关交易岂不变得混乱了！
luiswu1983
I agree with eric in all aspects but one,which is the last question presented above.
why the defendant refused to perform the contract which has been legally formed between the two parties we do not know upon the whole context of this judgement.
but one must be emphasized is that the outward expression of the defendant is tandem with his secret or unexpressed intention.since the intention of defendant for concluding this contract is so serious(the reason is clearly claified by eric above) and the defendant ,although drinks so much,can understand the context and consequences of this contract and his wife who is an resonable person had signed her name on the agreement collaterally,we has no reasaon to conclude that outward expression of the defendant was in contravention of his secret or unexpressed intention.
welcome to discuss below!
谢谢ERIC，我也一直想问这个案子，但太怕麻烦。我的疑问是
1.被告的妻子的签名是否具有法律约束力，（是不是还要考虑房产是否为夫妻共同财产的问题，其妻是否有代理权的问题~~我晕，可能我把问题复杂化了），如果有约束力，那被告就是喝的再醉，在判决也对他不利了。（但奇怪，原告怎么没提这点呢，可能还有一些其他事实罢？）
2.我觉得本案还有一个重要事实就是，当原告提出支付5美金作为对价时，被告意识到原告认真了，所以拒绝了，并说他是开玩笑的。他之所以没有进一步行动以阻止合同生效，就可以归结为当时的被告的精神状况（喝了很多酒），所以我认为，被告隐藏于心的意思与表达在外的意思是不同的。
（但法官并没有强调这个事实，如果我是法官我可能就要作出有利被告的判决了，呵呵）
既然被告已明确告诉了原告他是开玩笑的，为什么原告还可以合理以为合同成立？
大家怎么认为呢？
其实着案子除了外在表现出的客观真实意思外---客观标准
我认为还涉及了缔约能力
醉酒的人是否有缔约能力---认识标准（cognitive standard)，他是否有能力合理的理解交易的性质和后果
见笑了！
从英美法上说醉酒的人属于缺乏定约能力的人,依美国的法例,酗酒者订立的合同原则上有强制执行力,但如果酗酒者在定约时由于醉酒而失去了姓为能力,则可要求撤销合同.
所以还是要具体分析的.
案例讨论2
二 ．“格式之战”
Butler Machine
Tool Co. v. Ex—Cell---O Corp.
[1979] 1 W. L. R. 401, [1979] 1 ALL E. R. 956 (C. A.)
On 23rd May 1969, in response to an inquiry by the buyers, the sellers quoted a price for a machine tool of ￡75,535, with delivery to be given in 10 months. On the back of their offer were a number of terms and conditions, which stipulated that they were to “prevail over any terms and conditions in the buyer?s order”. One of the conditions purported to allow the seller to charge the buyers the price for the machine prevailing at the time of delivery. The buyers replied by placing an order for the purchase of the machine. Their document．nbspstipulated that the order was subject to a number of terms and conditions which differed from those put forward by the sellers and which, in particular, made no provision for any increase in price.
At the foot of the buyer?s order form, there was a tear-off slip upon which the sellers were invited to accept the order “on the terms and conditions stated thereon”. On 5th June 1969, the sellers completed and returned this slip to the buyers with a letter stating that the buyers? order was being entered in accordance with the sellers? quotation of 23rd May 1969. When the sellers ultimately came to deliver the machine, they claimed to be entitled to an additional ￡2,892, under the price formula of their original offer. The buyers took the position that their order prevailed and that there was accordingly a fixed price contract. The sellers? action for damages succeeded at trial on the ground that the price variation clause in the sellers? offer was a term which was intended to prevail.
Lord Denning M. R. … No doubt a contract was… concluded. But on what terms? The sellers rely on their general conditions and on their last letter which said ?in accordance with our revised quotation of 23rd May? (which had on the back the price variation clause). The buyers rely on the acknowledgment signed by the sellers which accepted the buyers? order ?on the terms and conditions stated thereon? (which did not include a price variation clause).
If those document． are analyzed in our traditional method, the result would seem to me to be this: the quotation of 23rd May 1969 was an offer by the sellers to the buyers containing the terms and conditions on the back. The order of 27th May 1969 purported to be an acceptance of that offer in that it was for the same machine at the same price, but it contained such additions as to cost of installation, date of delivery and so forth, that it was in law a rejection of the offer and constituted a counter-offer. That is clear from Hyde v. Wrench [supra, at 33]. As Megaw J said in Trollope & Colls v. Atomic Power Constructions [
[1962] 3 All E.R. 1035 at 1038] “… the counter-offer kills the original offer”. The letter of the sellers of 5th June 1969 was an acceptance of that counter-offer, as is shown by the acknowledgment which the sellers signed and returned to the buyers. The reference to the quotation of 23rd May 1969 referred only to the price and identity of the machine.
The better way is to look at all the document． passing between the parties and glean from them, or from the conduct of the parties, whether they have reached agreement on all material points, even though there may be differences between the forms and conditions printed on the back of them. As Lord Cairns LC said in Brogden v. Metropolitan Railway Co. [(1877), 2 App. Cas. 666 at 672]:
… there may be a consensus between the parties far short of a complete mode of expressing it, and that consensus may be discovered from letters or from other document． of an imperfect and incomplete description.
Applying this guide, it will be found that in most cases when there is a ?battle of forms? there is a contract as soon as the last of the forms is sent and received without objection being taken to it. That is well observed in Benjamin on Sale [9th ed. (1974), 84-85]. The difficulty is to decide which form, or which part of which form, is a term or condition of the contract. In some cases the battle is won by the man who fires the last shot. He is the man who puts forward the latest term and conditions; and, if they are not objected to by the other party, he may be taken to have agreed to them. Such was British Road Services Ltd. V. Arthur V. Crutchley * Co., [[1968] 1 All E. R. 8ll at 816-817 (C.A.)] per Lord Pearson; and the illustration given by Professor Guest in Anson?s Law of Contract [24th ed. (1975), 37-38] where he says that “the terms of the contract consist of the terms of the offer subject to the modifications contained in the acceptance”. That may however go too far. In some cases, however, the battle is won by the man who gets the blow in first. If he offers to sell at a named price on the terms and conditions stated on the back and the buyer orders the goods purporting to accept the offer on an order form with his own different terms and conditions on the back, then, if the difference is so material that it would affect the price, the buyer ought not to be allowed to take advantage of the difference unless he draws it specifically to the attention of the seller. There are yet other cases where the battle depends on the shots fired on both sides. There is a concluded contract but the forms vary. The terms and conditions of both parties are to be construed together. If they can be reconciled so as to give a harmonious result, all well and good. If differences are irreconcilable, so that they are mutually contradictory, then the conflicting terms may have to be scrapped and replaced by a reasonable implication.
In the present case the judge thought that the sellers in their original quotation got their blow in first, especially by the provision that ?These terms and conditions shall prevail over any terms and conditions in the Buyer?s order?. It was so emphatic that the price variation clause continued through all the subsequent dealings and that the buyer must be taken to have agreed to it. I can understand that point of view. But I think that the document． have to be considered as a whole. And, as a matter of construction, I think the acknowledgment of 5th June 1969 is the decisive document． It makes it clear that the contract was on the buyer?s terms and not on the sellers? terms; and the buyers? terms did not include a price variation clause.
I would therefore allow the appeal and enter judgment for the buyers.
[Lawton and Bridge L.JJ. delivered concurring judgments.]
思考题：
1 。 为什么法官说 “No doubt a contract was … concluded?”
篇二：勒特里尔墨菲特案例(case2-9 letelier and moffitt国际商法英文版第五版)
勒特里尔和墨菲特案例（RE LETELIER AND MOFFITT)
1.案件的发生（时间地点人物）
这个案件发生在1976年，前智利驻美大使奥兰多·勒特里尔（Orlando·Letelier）在美国华盛顿特区遭遇汽车炸弹袭击而身亡，同时受害的还有他的同事墨菲特夫妇（Moffitt)。
2. 原告与被告
原告是受害人的亲人；被告是智利政府
3.提起诉讼
受害人的亲人在美国提出诉讼，称智利政府负有责任。
4.被告的反应
智利政府拒绝为汽车爆炸案负责，但愿意付特惠补偿款给美国。
5.争论焦点
智利军政府是否负有责任，是否参与了谋杀。
6.审判与判决
根据目前书本资料来看，1980年，美国法庭裁定智利军政府参与了谋杀，并确定了三个高级官员。
1990年，美国和智利签订了一个协议，依据《1914条约》成立委员会，智利同意支付特惠补偿款，其数额由委员会决定。
7.赔偿
对伊丽莎白莫尔，勒特里尔和她的儿子们，在经济来源损失上赔偿为一百二十万美元；在精神损失上，赔偿伊丽莎白十六万美元，赔偿其四个孩子每人八万美元；在医疗花费上，共赔偿一万六千四百美元。对于墨菲特家庭做出相近似决定。所以赔偿金额是二百六十一万一千八百九十二美元。
8.裁定中用到的法律条文
从本文资料来看，只有涉及到《1914条约》又名《1914布莱恩苏亚雷斯穆希卡条约》，国际损害的恢复原状和赔偿损失。
案例启示
如果国家部门对于虐待负有责任，那么国家必须对受害者进行赔偿，受害人应当被尊重对待。赔偿应尽可能考虑到他们的需求和意愿，赔偿必须尽可能消除非法行为的所有结果，并恢复受害人受到伤害前的状况。
弗兰西斯科认为惩罚性赔偿在国际法下作为认可原则是不被接受的。要注意的是，在此案件中，法庭拥有审判权，只因为美国政府的积极介入，在外交上，对智利政府提要求，两国是友好关系。1914布莱恩苏亚雷斯穆希卡条约伟事件的解决做了铺垫。如果智利决定拒绝履行他在条约中的义务，也就不会有委员会的会议，特惠补偿款也不会出现。
篇三：国际商法复习案例的答案
1、甲公司向乙宾馆发出一封电报称：现有一批电器，其中电视机80台，每台售价3400元；电冰箱100台，每台售价2800元，总销售优惠价52万元。如有意购买，请告知。
乙宾馆接到该电报后，遂向甲公司回复称：只欲购买甲公司50台电视机，每台电视机付款3200元；60台电冰箱，每台电冰箱付款2500元，共计支付总货款31万元，货到付款。
甲公司接到乙宾馆的电报后，决定接受乙宾馆的要求。甲乙签订了买卖合同，约定交货地点为乙宾馆。 甲公司同时与丙运输公司签订了合同，约定由丙公司将货物运至乙宾馆。丙公司在运输货物途中遭遇洪水，致使部分货物毁损。丙公司将剩余的未遭损失的货物运至乙宾馆，乙宾馆要求甲公司将货物补齐后一并付款。
甲公司迅速补齐了货物，但乙宾馆以资金周转困难为由，表示不能立即支付货款，甲公司同意乙宾馆推迟1个月付款。1个月后经甲公司催告，乙宾馆仍未付款。于是，甲公司通知乙宾馆解除合同，乙宾馆不同意解除合同。甲公司拟向法院起诉，要求解除合同，并要求乙宾馆赔偿损失。要求：根据合同法律制度的规定，分别回答下列问题：
（1）甲公司向乙宾馆发出的电报是要约还是要约邀请？
（2）乙宾馆的回复是承诺还是新的要约？并说明理由。
（3）丙公司是否应对运货途中的货物毁损承担损害赔偿责任？并说明理由。
（4）甲公司能否解除与乙宾馆的买卖合同？并说明理由。
答：（1）甲公司向乙宾馆发出的电报是要约。
（2）乙宾馆的回复是新的要约。根据规定，受要约人对要约的内容作出实质性变更的，为新要约。在本题中，乙宾馆对要约中的价款和数量作出了变更，因此，乙宾馆的回复视为新要约。
（3）丙公司可以不承担损害赔偿责任。根据规定，承运人对运输过程中货物的毁损、灭失承担损害赔偿责任，但承运人证明货物的毁损、灭失是因不可抗力、货物本身的自然性质或者合理损耗以及托运人、收货人的过错造成的，不承担损害赔偿责任。本题中，丙公司在运输货物途中遭遇洪水，致使部分货物毁损属于因不可抗力造成的损失，因此，可以不承担损害赔偿责任。
（4）甲公司可以解除买卖合同。根据规定，当事人一方延迟履行主要债务，经催告后在合理期限内仍未履行的，一方当事人可以解除合同。在本题中，乙宾馆以资金周转困难为由不能立即支付货款，甲公司同意乙宾馆推迟1个月付款。1个月后经甲公司催告，乙宾馆仍未付款。因此，甲公司可以解除与乙宾馆的买卖合同。
2．中国A公司于l995年9月2日向德国B公司发出电报:“可供ART304，每公吨500美元，CIF上海，即装，请报价。”德国B公司于9月6日来电：“ART304，l00公吨，麻袋装，每公吨500美元，9月装，不可撤销即期信用证付款。”中国A公司没有再回电。后因国际市场价格上涨，A公司将该批货物售予他人。
试问:中国A公司与德国B公司之间是否成立了合同?
答. 合同没有成立. . 因为A 向B 发出的是要约邀请, 而B 的回复是要约. A没有再回复, 所以合同未成立.
3.中国C公司于1994年7月16日收到法国巴黎D公司来电：“马口铁500公吨。每吨545美元，CFR中国口岸，8月份装运，即期信用证支付，限20日复到有效。”我方于17日复电:“若单价为500美元，中国口岸，可接受500公吨马口铁，履行中如有争议在中国仲裁。”法国D公司当日复电：“市场坚挺，价格不能减，仲裁条件可接受。速复。”此时马口铁价格确实趁涨，我方便于19日复电:“接受你16日发出的要约，信用证已由中国银行开出。”但法商退回了信用证。
试问:合同是否成立?我方有无失误?
答：合同未成立. 因为我国公司的回复不及时, 也就是没有速复.
4.中国E公司，向美国F公司发价如下:报中国东北大豆500吨，大路货，每吨600美元，CIF条件，即期装船，不可撤销即期信用证付款，10月12日前电复有效。
F公司于10月7日复电如下:10月5日发价我接受，中国东北大豆500吨，大路货，每吨600美元，CIF条件，即期装船，不可撤销即期信用证付款，除通常的装运单据外，要求提供产地证、植物检疫证书，还需提供良好的适合海洋运输的袋装。E公司未给F公司任何答复，于10月13日将该批货物售给另一外商。而后，E公司和F公司就合同是否成立发生争议。
问：E和F之间是否已成立合同?
答：E和F之间合同成立. 因为F虽然修改了E要约的条件, 但F的回复是非实质性变更.
5.某年2月10日，中国A公司电告美国B公司，以FOB条件向B公司出口一批白糖，总价为50万美元，以信用证支付货款。2月16日收到B公司同意购买的回电，但要求降价至48万美元。A公司于2月19日电告对方同意其要求，B公司2月20日收到此电报。A公司将货物运至大连港， 货物由保险公司D办理了海洋运输货物保险的“水渍险”，之后按时由承运人某远洋公司C装船运输。在船舶驶向目的港的途中，因遭遇暴风雨使部分白糖被雨水淋湿，白糖受损。
请问：（1）该合同争议是否可以适用《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》？为什么？
（2）该合同何时成立？ 为什么？
（3）货物湿损，B公司能否要求A公司给予赔偿？为什么？
（4）该批货物的保险有谁办理？保险费有谁承担？可否向保险公司索赔？
答（1） 适用。两国都是公约缔约国。合同双方营业地处于不同国家。货物跨境买卖。
（2） 2月20日成立。承诺到达生效，合同成立。。
(3) 不能。FOB风险已由卖方转移给了买方
(4) A公司。不能向保险公司索赔，因为水渍险不保淡水雨淋致损。
6、我某公司向美商发盘，限6日复到有效。美商于4日发电表示接受。由于电报局投递延误，接受电报于7日上午送达我公司。此时，我方鉴于市价上升，当即回电拒绝。但美商认为接受通知迟到不是他的责任，坚持合同有效成立，而我方则不同意达成交易。
试问:我公司与美商之间是否成立了合同?
答.我公司与美商之间没有成立合同. 因为虽然承诺迟到, 但是我方当即回电拒绝..
7、A公司与B公司签订货物买卖合同。合同约定：A公司于9月10日向B公司交付优质煤矿5万吨，B公司于9月1日预付货款的50%，余款于交付货物后10日内付清。9月1日，B公司得悉，由于C公司出价优惠，A公司又与C公司订立煤矿买卖合同，并将已经确定给B公司的5万吨煤矿中的3万吨运给了C公司，并在继续发运。9月5日，因A公司的生产基地遭遇特大洪水，损失惨重。A公司被迫宣告破产。为满足生产，B公司以高于合同价格的市场价格购买了煤矿。
问：B公司9月1日可以行使什么权利？B的损失由谁承担？
A公司与B公司签订一批货物买卖合同，A向B购买大型机器设备，价款500万元，合同约定违约金100万元。
问：如果B违约未能供货，给A造成实际损失5万元，B要求减少违约金的数额，法律是否允许? 如果B违约给A造成8000万元的损失，B能否提出减少赔偿金额的要求？
答： B公司9月1日可以行使不安抗辩权. B的损失由A承担..
(1) 法律允许. 因为约定的违约金过分高于实际造成的损失.
(2) 法律允许. 因为8000万的实际损失超出了一般的人对此合同违约可能所造成的损失的预见..
8. 甲、乙、丙均具有注册会计师资格，他们三人投资5万元组成一个合伙制会计师事务所，对外承揽业务。受利益驱使，甲、乙为某公司出具了虚假的财务被告，获利4万元。后被有关机关发现，对该事务所罚款5万元，并须由该事务所承担因该虚假财务报告给有关当事人造成的损失30万元。
问题：对于罚款及损失承担，甲、乙、丙各负什么责任？为什么？
答： 甲、乙承担无限连带责任，丙以投资为限承担有限责任。因为该合伙企业为特殊的普通合伙。若合伙人故意或重大过失造成企业损失，应承担无限连带责任，无过错的合伙人负有限责任。
9、某房地产股份公司注册资本为人民币2亿元。后来由于房地产市场不景气，公司年底出现了无法弥补的经营亏损，亏损总额为人民币7000万元。某股东据此请求召开临时股东大会。公司决定于次年4月10日召开临时股东大会，并于3月20日在报纸上刊登了向所有的股东发出了会议通知。通知确定的会议议程包括以下事项：
（1）选举更换部分董事，选举更换董事长；
（2）选举更换全部监事；
（3）更换公司总经理；
（4）就发行公司债券作出决议；
（5）就公司与另一房地产公司合并作出决议。 在股东大会上，上述各事项均经出席大会的股东所持表决权的半数通过。 根据上述材料，回答以下问题：
（1）公司发生亏损后，在股东请求时，应否召开股东大会？为什么？
（2）公司在临时股东大会的召集、召开过程中，有无与法律规定不相符的地方？
答：（1）公司发生经营亏损后，在股东请求时，应当召开临时股东大会。召开的理由是，该公司的未弥补亏损7000万元已超过注册资本2亿元的1/3。
（2）该公司在临时股东大会的召集、召开过程中，存在以下与法律不符的地方：
召开临时股东大会应提前15日通知股东，该公司通知股东的时间合法；
选举更换董事长，不属于股东大会的职权，应由董事会选举更换董事长；
股东大会不能选举、更换全部监事，因其中有公司职工选出的监事，股东大会只能选举更换由股东代表出任的监事；
更换聘任公司经理，是董事会的职权，不是股东大会的职权；
公司合并决议应经出席股东大会的股东所持表决权的2/3，而不是半数以上通过。
10、某股份有限公司董事会由11名董事组成。2007年5月10日，公司董事长李某召集并主持召开董事会会议，出席会议的共8名董事，另有3名董事因事请假。董事会会议讨论了下列事项，经表决有6名董事同意而通过。
（1）鉴于公司董事会成员工作任务加重，决定给每位董事涨工资30%；
（2）鉴于监事会成员中的职工代表张某生病，决定由本公司职工王某参加监事会；
（2）（3）鉴于公司的财务会计工作日益繁重，拟将财务科升级为财务部，并向社会公开招聘会计人员3名，招聘会计人员事宜及财务科升格为财务部的方案经股东大会通过后实施；
（4）鉴于公司的净资产额已达2900万元，符合有关公司发行债券的法律规定，决定发行公司债券1000万元。
根据以上材料回答以下问题：（1）公司董事会的召开和表决程序是否符合法律规定？为什么？（2）公司董事会通过的事项有无不符合法律规定之处？如有，请分别说明理由。
答： （1）公司董事会会议的召开和表决程序符合法律规定。按照公司法的规定，股份有限公司董事会须有1/2以上的董事出席方可举行，董事会会议由董事长召集并主持；董事会决议须经全体董事过半数通过。
（2）董事会通过的事项中有不符合法律规定之处：
——董事会决议给每位董事涨工资的决定违法。按照公司法的规定，决定董事的报酬属于公司股东大会的职权；
——董事会决议由公司职工王某参加监事会的决议违法。根据公司法的规定，选举和更换由职工代表出任的监事应由公司职工民主选举；
——董事会认为将公司财务科升格为财务部的方案须经股东大会通过的观点不符合法律规定。根据公司法的规定，公司董事会有权决定公司内部管理机构的设置
——董事会认为公司的净资产额达到发行公司债券的法定条件的观点不符合法律规定。根据公司法的规定，股份公司发行公司债券，其净资产额应不低于人民币3000万元